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CIVIL PROCEDURE-COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL-THE EVOLUTION
OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN ARKANSAS: IS MUTUALITY OF EsTOPPEL AN ANACHRONISM? Davidson v. Lonoke Production Credit

Association, 695 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1982).
Owen G. Glass, a farmer in Perry County, Arkansas, received a
loan from the appellee Lonoke Production Credit Association. In
return, the appellee was given a security interest in Glass' crops,
equipment and proceeds. A financing statement containing a purported description of the two farms on which Mr. Glass' crops were
to be grown was filed with the Perry County Circuit Clerk. Subsequent to this filing, one of Glass' creditors sought a writ of garnishment against a portion of the crops which had been stored in a local
grain elevator. The writ was issued pursuant to an order in a state
proceeding between Glass and the creditor. The appellee answered
the garnishment petition alleging a security interest in the crops.
The Pulaski County Circuit Court found that the crops had not been
properly identified as being grown on the farms. described in the
financing statement and held that the security interest was therefore
invalid. The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed.'
Glass then filed a bankruptcy petition 2 and appellant, Charles
Davidson, became trustee of the bankrupt estate. Again, the appellee claimed a security interest in the crops but this time the appellee
sought the remainder of the crops, a portion of which the creditor
had garnished in the prior state proceeding. The bankruptcy court
held that the description of the farm and crops in the financing
statement was sufficient to perfect a lien pursuant to section 9-402(1)
3
of the Uniform Commercial Code.
The appellant appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
claiming that the appellee's alleged security interest was invalid because the identification in the financing statement was insufficient;
1. Lonoke Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Carnation, No. 77-225 (Feb. 20, 1978). This case was
not designated for publication.
2. It is not clear from the opinion whether the bankruptcy petition was filed subse-

quent to the state proceeding or whether the bankruptcy court allowed the state proceeding
to continue.
3. According to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-402(l) (Supp. 1983), a financing statement is
sufficient if it names the debtor and the secured party's address and gives a mailing address
for the debtor. A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a
security interest otherwise attaches. When the financing statement covers crops growing or
to be grown, the statement must also contain a description of the real estate concerned.
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and that the appellee was collaterally estopped from relitigating his
claim. Accepting appellant's collateral estoppel argument as dispositive, the court of appeals did not address the issue of the sufficiency
of the crop description and held that the Lonoke Production Credit
Association was barred from relitigating the issue as to its security
interest. Davidson v. Lonoke ProductionCreditAssociation, 695 F.2d

1115 (8th Cir. 1982).
The application of collateral estoppel is an outgrowth of the
generally accepted doctrine of mutuality of estoppel.' Under the
doctrine of mutuality of estoppel, 5 parties and their privies must
have been bound by a prior judgment on the merits in order to later
invoke or be subjected to the preclusive effect of collateral estoppel. 6
The development of collateral estoppel and mutuality of estoppel began with Roman Law7 and was an outgrowth of the doctrine
of res judicata8 which applied only to the same parties in a previous
action. At common law the rules of res judicata and mutuality of
estoppel were formulated in the Duchess of Kingston's Case.9 In this
case Lord Chief Justice DeGrey wrote:
First, that the judgment of a court of concurrent jurisdiction directly upon the point is

.

. conclusive between the same parties

upon the same parties, upon the same matter directly in question
in another court. Secondly, that the judgment of a court.

. .

di-

rectly upon the point is in like manner conclusive upon the same
matter between the same parties coming incidentally in question
4. RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §

17, comment c (1982) provides:

In a subsequent action between the parties the judgment generally is conclusive as
to the issues raised in the subsequent action if those issues were actually litigated
and determined in the prior action and if their determination was essential to the
judgment. When the subsequent action is on a different claim, this effect of the
judgment is sometimes designated a collateral estoppel.
5. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 584-88
(1965).
6. According to M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 212 (1972), this premise is based
on an idea of fairness in that every man is entitled to his day in court, and unless he has had
that day, prior judgments are not binding on him.
7. See H. BROOM, A SELECTION OF LEGAL MAXIMS: CLASSIFIED AND ILLUSTRATED
222, 241 (4th ed. 1854).
8. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 79 (1942). The Romans explained resjudicata
in the legal maxim of Nemo Debt Bis Vexari Pro Una et Eadem Causa, which means that a

man shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause. From this phrase the Romanic
concepts exceptice reifudicata (the subject matter of the action has been determined in a
previous action) and resjudicatapro veritate accipitur (a matter adjudged is taken for truth)
developed into what is known today as res judicata. H. BROOM, supra note 7 at 222.
9. 20 St. Tr. 355 (H.L. 1776).
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in another court for a different purpose.l°
Judgments were also binding upon privies" to parties in a prior

litigation.' 2 The

RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 13

defined the mod-

em view of privity to include "[tihose who control an action although not parties to it;' 4 those whose interests are represented by a
party to the action; 15 and successors in interest to those having derivative claims."' 6 Therefore, to say that a person had the benefit as
a privy was a way of stating that under the circumstances and for
the purpose of the case at hand, he was bound by and entitled to the
benefits of all or some of the rules of res judicata, by way of merger,
bar or collateral estoppel. 7
The leading American case adhering to the mutuality rule was
Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co. ,18 which
involved an action by a copper company to recover secret profits
realized by Bigelow and his associate. Bigelow claimed that the
copper company was barred from bringing the action because of a
prior suit against his associate, which was adjudged adversely to the
copper company. In concluding that joint tortfeasors were not privies so as to bar a subsequent suit against Bigelow, the Supreme
Court proclaimed:
It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a
judgment must be mutual .... There can be no estoppel arising
out of a judgment, unless the same parties have had their day in
court touching the matter litigated, and unless the judgment is
equally available to both parties. 9
Although mutuality of estoppel was pervasive in the United
States during the Bigelow era, there were generally acknowledged
exceptions. ° The most recognized exception, derivative liability, 1
10. Id at 538.
11. The Restatement has abandoned the term "privity" for language such as "represen-

tation" and "relationship".
Chapter 1 at 14.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

JUDGMENTS,

Introduction to

12. See H. BROOM, supra note 7 at 227.

13. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 83, comment a (1942).
14. Id at § 84, Illustration 1.
15. Id at § 85, Illustration 5.
16. Id at § 89, Illustration 1.
17. Id at § 83, comment a.
18. 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
19. Id.at 127, 131.
20. For a general analysis see 31 A.L.R.3d 1044 (1970). Most of these exceptions involved closely related people who were not technically parties. Such exceptions have involved husband and wife; parent and child; voucher and vouchee; insurer and insured;
partner and co-partner; guardian and ward; trustor and trustee and beneficiaries; and in-
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was premised on an idea of fairness and justice and proposed that
one should not be able to relitigate the same issues against a person
whose liability is dependent on another. According to the Bigelow
court, "[an apparent exception to this rule of mutuality had been
held to exist where the liability of the defendant is altogether dependent upon the culpability of one exonerated in a prior suit, upon the
same facts, when sued by the same plaintiff."22
Some courts viewed mutuality of estoppel as an impediment to
efficient and practical judicial administration.23 Relying on such an
idea, one court reasoned that:
The requirement of mutuality must yield to public policy. To
hold otherwise would be to allow repeated litigation of identical
questions, expressly adjudicated, and to allow a litigant having
lost on a question of fact to re-open and re-try all the old issues
each time he24 can obtain a new adversary not in privity with his
former one.

After centuries of dominance, the principle of mutuality began
a gradual downfall 25 culminating with the California case of Bernhard v. Bank of America .26 Although there had been cases criticizing the rule of mutuality of estoppel, 2 ' none had ruled directly
against it until Bernhard. In ruling that a prior probate decision
barred relitigating the issue as to the status of money deposited in
the Bank of America, the Bernhard court proclaimed that, "There is
demnitor, indemnitee and a third person. Id at 1064-67. See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 94-111 (1942).
21. See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 599 (1965); M. GREEN, supra note 6, at 215;
Giedrewicz v. Donovan, 277 Mass. 563, 179 N.E. 246 (1932); Schimke v. Earley, 173 Ohio

St. 521, 184 N.E.2d 209 (1962). The Supreme Court recognized this exception in Bigelow
although it did not find such a situation in the case at bar. Bigelow, 225 U.S. at 127-28.
22. 225 U.S. at 127-28.
23. E.g., Jenkins v. Atlantic Coast Line R., 89 S.C. 408, 412, 71 S.E. 1010, 1012 (quoting
Logan v. Atlantic & Charlotte Airline R. Co., 82 S.C. 522, 64 S.E. 515 (1909)), the state's
highest court said:
[I]n such cases on grounds of public policy, the principle of estoppel should be
expanded, so as to embrace within the estoppel of a judgment persons who are not,
strictly speaking, either parties or privies. It is rested upon the wholesome principle which allows every litigant one opportunity to try his case on the merits, but
limits him, in the interest of the public to one such opportunity.
24. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 172 A. 260, 263 (Del. Super. Ct. 1934); See also
Cohen v. Superior Oil Corp. 16 F. Supp. 221, afd, 90 F.2d 810, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726
(1937).
25. See Currie, Mutuality of CollateralEstoppel- Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9
STAN. L. REV. 281, 284 n.6 (1957).

26.

19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).

27. E.g., Coca-Cola, 172 A. at 263; Cohen, 16 F. Supp. 221.
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no compelling reason. . . for requiring that the party asserting the
plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity with a
party to the earlier litigation."28 The court declared:
In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata, three questions are pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question?
Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against
whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication?2 9
After Bernhard, many jurisdictions gradually abandoned the
mutuality rule either in whole or in part.30 Furthermore, the courts
abandoning mutuality either expressly or indirectly required a party
or his privy to have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in
question in a prior proceeding. 31 This requirement of a full and fair
opportunity to litigate was adopted by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS. 3 2 In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court also rejected the
mutuality rule in Blonder-Tongue Laboratories,Inc. v. University of

Illinois.33 Justice White, writing for the Court, stated, "[U]ncritical
acceptance of the principle of mutuality of estoppel. . . is today out
of place."' 34 Although this decision applied only to patent cases, the
Supreme Court indicated that mutuality was an idea of the past.35
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of mutuality, not every jurisdiction was ready to denounce its application.
Furthermore, Bernhardleft a question in the minds of most ob-

28. 19 Cal.2d at 809, 122 P.2d at 894.
29. Id at 810, 122 P.2d at 895. See also B. R. Dewitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967) (the New York Court of Appeals called mutuality of
estoppel a "dead letter"). Id at 147, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601, 225 N.E.2d at 198.
30. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Foods Div., 327 F.2d 944 (2d.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); Schwartz v. Public Admr., 24 N.Y.2d 65, 298
N.Y.S.2d 955, 246 N.E.2d 725 (1969); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y.2d 116, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956). See also, 112 A.L.R. 401 (1938); Note, The Requirement
of Mutuality in Estoppel by Judgment, 29 ILL. L. REV. 93 (1934); Note, Effect of Servant's
Recovery Against Third Party Upon Master's Subsequent Action Against ThirdParty, 12 CORNELL L. Q. 92 (1927); Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine ofRes Judicata, 35

L.J. (1926); 321 A.L.R.3d, supra note 20.
31. See 31 A.L.R.3d, supra note 20, at 1067. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90(1980)
(Blonder-Tongue Laboratories Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois, 402 U.S. 313 (1971)).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1982).
33. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
34. Id. at 350.
35. See, e.g., Standage Ventures Inc. v. State, 114 Ariz. 480, 562 P.2d 360 (1977);
Lukacs v. Kluessner, 154 Ind. App. 452, 290 N.E.2d 125 (1972); Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan.
482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969).
YALE
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servers as to the scope and effect of the ruling. The Bernhard court
used broad language which seemingly indicated that both the defensive use and the offensive use of collateral estoppel could be utilized
notwithstanding the lack of mutuality. The defensive use occurred
when a defendant sought to prevent a plaintiff from asserting a
claim which the plaintiff had previously litigated and lost against
another defendant. The offensive use arose when the plaintiff
sought to foreclose the defendant from relying on a defense which36
had been relied on unsuccessfully in an action with another party.
However, the scope of Bernhard was not clear and therefore many
jurisdictions limited the application of the Bernhard rule.37
Despite the concern surrounding the offensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel, a number of courts adopted its application.3 8 For instance, in B. R. De Wil, Inc. v. Hall,3 9 the New York

Court of Appeals applied the offensive use and pointed out that
there is no reason to apply mutuality in the following circumstances:
(1) The issues in the first and the subsequent proceeding were
identical; (2) The defendant offered no reason for not being held
to the determination in the first action; (3) It was unquestioned
that the first action was defended with full vigor and opportunity
to be heard; and (4) The plaintiff in the present action derived his
right to recover from the plaintiff in the first action although they
did not technically stand in the relationship of privity.4 °

Providing substantial credibility to the offensive use of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court in 1979 announced its approval of
nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel in Parklane Hosiery Co.,
36. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979).
37. E.g., Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois, 402 U.S. 313 (1971);
Makris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966); Bruszewski v.
United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865 (1950); Ham v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 283 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Okla. 1968); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213
A.2d 26 (1965); Albernaz v. Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 191 N.E.2d 771 (1963); McAndrew v.
Mularchuk, 38 N.J. 156, 183 A.2d 74 (1962); Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., I N.Y.2d 116, 151
N.Y.S.2d 1, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364
(1955).
38. E.g., Provident Tradesmen Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co.,
411 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Webber, 396 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1968); Zdanok v.
Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Food Division, 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 934 (1964); Maryland v. Capital Airlines Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967);
Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967); McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis.2d
607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1956).
39. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967).
40. Id at 148, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02, 225 N.E.2d at 199.
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Inc. v. Shore.4 The Court recognized the potential unfairness of
the offensive use of collateral estoppel, although they did not find an
unfair situation in that case. 42 The Court emphasized that the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior decision, 43 and further concluded that the best approach was to allow
the trial court broad discretion in determining the applicability of
the offensive use of collateral estoppel. 44 Moreover, the Court reasoned that when the plaintiff could have easily joined in the earlier
action, or when the offensive use would be unfair 45 to a defendant,
the trial judge as a general rule should not allow the use of offensive
collateral estoppel.

6

The Court denounced the idea that the lack of

mutuality of estoppel denied a person his right to a jury trial under
the seventh amendment. 47 After the ParklaneHosiery decision, the
idea of mutuality of estoppel reached its lowest point while both the
defensive and offensive uses of collateral estoppel gained support.

More importantly, the

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS

adopted the basic approach established by Bernhard,ParklandHo-

siery and their progeny.48 The

RESTATEMENT

further proposed that

41. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
42. Id. at 329. The Court delineated three potential pitfalls in the application of the
offensive use of collateral estoppel:
First, offensive use of collateral estoppel does not promote judicial economy in
Since a plaintiff will be able to rely
the same manner as defensive use does....
on a previous judgment against a defendant but will not be bound by that judgment if the defendant wins, the plaintiff has every incentive to adopt a "wait and
see" attitude, in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a
favorable judgment. . . . Thus offensive use will likely increase the total amount
of litigation . ..
[O]ffensive use. . . may be unfair to a defendant. If the defendant in the first
action is sued for nominal damages, he may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particularly if future suits are not foreseeable. . . . Allowing offensive collateral estoppel may also be unfair to a defendant if the judgment relied upon as a
basis for the estoppel is inconsistent with one or more previous judgments in favor
of the defendant. . . . [A]nother type of situation where it might be unfair to
apply offensive estoppel is where the second action affords the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily cause a different result.
Id at 329-31.
43. Id. at 332.
44. Id at 331.
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id at 335. The seventh amendment provides that "[i]n suits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend. VII.

48.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

§ 29 (1982).
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there was no intrinsic difference between the offensive and defensive
uses.

49

The development of mutuality of estoppel in Arkansas followed a path similar to that in other jurisdictions. Historically, Arkansas espoused a commitment to the mutuality rule.5 0 One of the
earliest Arkansas cases advancing the doctrine of mutuality was
Treadwell v. Pills5 ' in which the Arkansas Supreme Court declared
that creditors were not estopped from relitigating the issue of fraud
even though there had been an adverse judgment as to this issue in
their prior attachment suit. According to the court, "[T]he principle
is the same under the rule that estoppels must be mutual."5 2 This
rule, as in other jurisdictions, applied to privies as well as to parties
in a prior litigation. 3 For instances, in Bank of Mulberry v. Fra-

zier, 54 the Arkansas Supreme Court declared, "A judgment or decree is binding not only on parties, but privies."55
Arkansas also has adhered to the generally recognized exception of derivative liability.56 Probably the leading Arkansas case
following the principle of derivative liability is Davis v. Perryman."
Davis involved a suit brought against an employer after a prior suit
49. Id, Reporter's note, at 299-300. But compare, United States v. Mendoza, 104 S.Ct.
568 (1984) which denied the use of offensive collateral estoppel by a private party against the
United States government, with United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 104 S.Ct. 575 (1984),
which approved the use of defensive collateral estoppel against the government.
50. See, e.g., Ripley v. Kelly, 209 Ark. 389, 190 S.W.2d 526 (1945); Collum v. Hervey,
176 Ark. 714, 3 S.W.2d 993 (1928); Avera v. Rice, 64 Ark. 330, 42 S.W. 409 (1897); Bell v.
Wilson, 52 Ark. 171, 12 S.W. 328 (1889); Toby v. Brown, I1 Ark. (5 Eng.) 308 (1850).
51. 64 Ark. 447, 43 S.W.142 (1897).
52. Id at 450, 43 S.W.at 144.
53. Crane Boom Life Guard Co., v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1966); C. & L. Rural Elec. Co-op Corp. v. Kincaid, 221 Ark. 450,
256 S.W.2d 337 (1953); Kirby v. Milum, 218 Ark. 106, 234 S.W.2d 518 (1950); Bank of
Mulberry v. Frazier, 178 Ark. 28, 9 S.W.2d 793 (1928); Eldred v. Johnson, 75 Ark. 1, 86 S.W.
670 (1905).
54. 178 Ark. 28, 9 S.W.2d 793 (1928).
55. Id at 35, 9 S.W.2d at 795.
56. See Ted Saum & Co. v. Swaffar, 237 Ark. 971, 377 S.W.2d 606 (1964). See, e.g.,
Fleming v. Cooper, 225 Ark. 634, 284 S.W.2d 857 (1955) (wife was bound by prior judgment
against husband who acted as her agent and manager in a lease agreement and also wife and
husband were found to be in privity); Hunt v. Quarles, 174 Ark. 342, 295 S.W. 44 (1927)
(court ruled that prior judgment finding that appellant, a subcontractor, could not recover
against a Phillips County drainage district for breach of contract barred an action against
the appellee since the contract between appellant and appellee became a part of a contract
between appellee and the drainage district which made the latter liable for any expenses to
the former); Lashbrooke v. Cole, 124 Ark. 48, 186 S.W. 317 (1916) (appellant was deemed to
have the right to plead the discharge of his co-surety as grounds for his release from liability). See also RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 94-111 (1942).
57. 225 Ark. 963, 286 S.W.2d 844 (1956).
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established the lack of negligence on the part of the employee, Perryman, while in the scope of his employment. Justice McFaddin
wrote:
[We] hold that the plaintiff, after a prior unsuccessful damage
action against the master or servant for alleged negligence of the
servant, is barred from maintaining a subsequent action involving the same mishap when it was and is conceded in both actions
that the servant was at the time acting within the scope of his
employment and the only questions are negligence and contributory negligence.5
Even though Arkansas recognized the exceptions, the state's courts
have adhered to the application of mutuality, and despite the ruling
in Bernhard and the general trend away from mutuality, Arkansas
has not abandoned the mutuality rule. 9
Several Arkansas decisions that have discussed mutuality have
emphasized that there must be a full and fair opportunity to litigate
an issue in a prior suit.60 However, these decisions dealt with collateral estoppel only in dicta. 6' Although these decisions alluded to the
judicial necessity to end litigation, they relied on reasons other than
collateral estoppel to deny relitigation of an issue or cause of
action.62
In Davidson63 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the
preclusive effect of collateral estoppel and the requirement of mutality between parties. Noting the lack of Arkansas law pertaining to
collateral estoppel and the mutuality rule, the court of appeals focused on the general development of the concepts. Notwithstanding
the lack of clear guidance on collateral estoppel, the court decided
the case as it believed the Arkansas appellate courts would have.
Justice Arnold, writing for the court, analyzed the mutuality rule in
light of Bernhard,Parklane Hosiery and the RESTATEMENT

(SEC-

58. ld at 970, 286 S.W.2d at 848. See also Eva Russell v. Nekoosa Papers, Inc., 261
Ark. 79, 547 S.W.2d 409 (1977).
59. See, e.g., Crane Boom Life Guard Co. v. Saf-T Boom Corp., 362 F.2d 317 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1966); Larcon Co. v. Wallingsford, 136 F. Supp. 602 (W.D.
Ark. 1955), qfl'd, 237 F.2d 904 (8th Cir. 1956); Bentrup v. Hoke, 245 Ark. 572, 433 S.W.2d
139 (1968).
60. See Wells v. Heath, 269 Ark. 473, 602 S.W.2d 665 (1980), appealafter remand, 622
S.W.2d 163 (1980); Ted Saum & Co. v. Swaffar, 237 Ark. 971, 377 S.W.2d 606 (1964); Rose
v. Jacobs, 231 Ark. 286, 329 S.W.2d 170 (1959); Davis v. Perryman, 225 Ark. 963, 286
S.W.2d 844 (1956).
61. See cases cited supra note 60.
62. See cases cited supra note 60. Therefore, notwithstanding Davidson, until there is a
case without the exceptions, the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel remains in Arkansas.
63. 695 F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1982).
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Although the court recognized the general
adherence to mutuality by the Arkansas courts, 64 the absence of
meaningful litigation in the area of collateral estoppel provided an
incentive for the Eighth65Circuit to examine the present status of Arkansas' mutuality rule.
In the court's opinion, Bernhard and Parklane Hosiery effectively stifled the mutuality rule.66 In Bernhard67 the mutuality rule
was replaced with three basic questions 68 which focused on the
availability of a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue in a
prior proceeding. Accordingly, the court of appeals concluded that
these questions were answered affirmatively and that the prior state
proceeding had afforded a full and fair opportunity to Lonoke Production Credit Association. 69 Also, the court of appeals emphasized
that the Bernhard rationale was extended further by ParklaneHosiery.7" Again, the requirement of a full and fair opportunity to
litigate in a prior proceeding was recommended. 7 ' Although concerns 72 were voiced about the offensive use of nonmutual collateral
estoppel, the court emphasized that offensive use was similar to defensive use.73
In analyzing Arkansas law, the court cited cases 74 which rejected a strict application of mutuality. Although these cases did not
address the mutuality rule directly, they did suggest that Arkansas
courts are more concerned with the full and fair opportunity rationale established in Bernhard and Parklane Hosiery7 5 than with
whether or not parties or their privies were involved in a prior action. Furthermore, given the fact that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS incorporated the rationale of Bernhard and ParklandHosiery, the court of appeals believed that Arkansas would folOND) OF JUDGMENTS.

64. Id at 1117, 1120.
65. Id at 1117.
66. Id. at 1119.
67. 19 Cal.2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
68. See supra text accompanying note 32.
69. Davidson, 695 F.2d at 1115, 1121.
70. Id at 1118. In Parklane Hosiery the Supreme Court approved the defensive use
and expanded nonmutual collateral estoppel to include the offensive use. 439 U.S. at 32931.
71. 695 F.2d at 1118-19.
72. ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 332.
73. Davidson, 695 F.2d at 1121.
74. 695 F.2d at 1120 (citing Ted Saum & Co. v. Swaffar, 237 Ark. 971, 377 S.W.2d 606
(1964)); Rose v. Jacobs, 231 Ark. 286, 329 S.W.2d 170 (1959); Davis v. Perryman, 225 Ark.
963, 286 S.W.2d 844 (1956)).
75. Davidson, 695 F.2d at 1120.
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For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals delivered a major blow to mutuality of estoppel in Arkansas. In essence the Davidson court found that Lonoke Production Credit Association had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate the crop description issue in the
prior state proceeding, and therefore was estopped from further litigation. In addition, the court approved the offensive use as well as
the defensive use of nonmutual collateral estoppel, giving full support to nonmutual issue proclusion and its objectives.
The Davidson decision follows the majority view in the area of
issue proclusion. Although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
speculated about how the Arkansas courts would hold, this decision
enunciates an enlightened view that has spread across the country.
Given the deep-rooted application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, it is likely that the idea of mutuality is on the road to extinction7 7 since the eradication of mutuality fosters the purpose and
78
goals of collateral estoppel.
However, courts must be cautious in the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel especially when it is used offensively. A
judicious application of collateral estoppel is necessary in order to
avoid the concerns addressed by the Supreme Court in ParklaneHosiery. 79 This can be done by focusing on the guidelines set out in

Bernhard,80 ParklandHosiery8 ' and the
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It is the writer's opinion that mutuality of estoppel must
fall. To allow its continuance would place a burden on our system
of justice which cannot be supported.
Ronald Carl Wilson

76. Id at 1121.
77. For a list of states adhering to mutuality, see Frans, Non-mutual Issue Preclusion in
Kansas, 30 KAN. L. REV. 443 n,30 (1982). See also Gibson, Civil Procedure-Abandonment
of the Mutuality Requirement, 22 ARK. L. REV. 491 (1968). This article proposes that given
the right case, Arkansas courts could abandon the mutuality rule. Id. at 500.

78. These goals have been generally: (1) finality of judgments; (2) judicial economy;
(3) protection of litigants from unnecessary and repetitive litigation; and (4) the protection of
judicial integrity by avoiding inconsistent results.
79. 439 U.S. 322, 329-31 (1979).
80. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).

81. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
82.
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